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From Judging Culture to Taxing
"Indians": Tracing the Legal Discourse
of the "Indian Mode of Life"
CONSTANCE MacINTOSH

*

In this article I consider how judicial decision making characterizes Indigenous peoples'
culture outside the context of determinations under section 3511) of the Constitution Act,
1982. 1am concerned with how contemporary jurisprudence sometimes subjects Indigenous
people to stereotyped tests of Aboriginality when they seek to exercise legislated rights.
These common law tests of Aboriginality tend to turn on troubling oppositional logics, such
as whether or not the Indigenous person engages in waged tabour or commercial activities.
These tests arose in historic legislation and poticy that were premised on social evolutionary
theory and were directed at determining whether an Indigenous person was to be deemed
economically assimilated. Before such legislation and policies were repealed, however, the
tests crossed into the common law and have since been read into legislation. As a result,
the doctrine of precedent has reinforced and continually renewed this oppressive discourse
to the present day. This article is, in essence, a call to critically engage and confront the
assumptions that underlie our rubrics of analysis.
Dans cet article, j'examine La faon dont [a prise de ddcisions judiciaires attribue des
caract6ristiques 6 Ia culture des peuples indig6nes hors du contexte des d6terminations
aux termes du paragraphe 35 (i1 de La Loi constitutionnelle de 1982. Je m'intdresse 6 Ia
mani~re dont [a jurisprudence contemporaine soumet parfois les peuples indig&nes 6 des
tests stdr6otypds d'autochtonie lorsqu'ils cherchent 6 exercer les droits que leur accorde
(a l6gislation. Ces tests d'autochtonit6 aux termes de [a common law ont tendance 6 engendrer une logique troublante d'opposition. comme de savoir si oui ou non une personne
indigene est engag6e dans des activit6s salari6es ou commerciales. Ces tests tirent leur
origine de La l6gislation et des politiques historiques, lesquelles 6taient fond6es sur le
postulat de [a th6orie 6volutionnaire et visaient 6 d6terminer siun indigene devait 6tre cens6
comme assimil6 du point de vue 6conomique. Toutefois, avant que de telles l6gislations et
Associate Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. I thank and acknowledge
both John Borrows and Brian Noble for their helpful and encouraging comments on an
earlier draft of this article. I also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for the care with
which they reviewed and commented on my article and, in particular, for pointing out
several historical errors, as well as the student editors of the Law Journal for their meticulous
work. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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politiques ne soient abrog6es, les tests ont impr6gn6I Lacommon law, et sont depuis incrust{s
dans [a l6gistation. Par cons~quent, (a doctrine du pr6c6dent a renforci et constamment
renouve[6 ce discours oppresseur, et ce, jusqu'6 nos jours. En substance, cet article constitue
une invitation pousser et 6 confronter, d'un point de vue critique, tes hypotheses qui soustendent tes rubriques de notre analyse.
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WHEN I ENTERED LAW SCHOOL after completing graduate work in anthropology,
I was both intrigued and troubled by how notions of culture were deployed in
legal reasoning about Aboriginal peoples. I was surprised to read that decisions
could turn on whether a person was living an "Indian mode of life," and wondered how such a concept could be intelligible, much less legally relevant. My
experiences with Aboriginal rights claims after law school augmented my concerns, as many of these claims turned on whether certain practices were deemed
integral to an Aboriginal people's culture. The idea of lawyers making arguments
about such matters in a courtroom, and a judge then determining the core features of an Aboriginal people's culture, seemed to be an extreme exercise in
colonialism.1 Once I began teaching law, I found myself hesitating whenever I
taught the logic and language of recent taxation cases, which asked whether
certain property ought to be shielded from taxation or garnishment to "preserve
1.

For an eloquent critique of how Aboriginal identity has been defined and shaped by nonAboriginal people, see Emma Laroque, Defeathering the Indian (Agincourt: Book Society of
Canada, 1975) at 8.
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the traditional way of life in Indian communities by protecting property held
by Indians qua Indians." 2 In-class discussions would rage for hours about what
the phrases "Indians qua Indians" and "the traditional way of life" meant.
Aboriginal peoples' cultures and cultural practices have a long history of
being portrayed and employed in a variety of legal decision-making contexts.
However, much of the current scholarly literature focuses on decisions pertaining
to section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,' under which the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized
and affirmed."' This focus is no surprise, given that the provision forms the
basis for the complex project of reconciling Canadian claims of sovereignty with
the fact that "aboriginal people were the original organized society occupying
and using Canadian lands."'
As articulated in R. v. Van der Peet,6 the test for recognizing rights under
section 35(1) rests on an inquiry into what practices are integral to the culture
of an Aboriginal people or community at the time of European contact with
that people. This test has been subject to extensive and careful scrutiny by such
scholars as Michael Asch, John Borrows, Patrick Macklem, and Kent McNeil.
Among other critiques, they conclude that the test situates Aboriginal culture as
frozen in time and reduces it to a series of discrete stereotypes.7 They also share
the critique that the test creates an optic of analysis that, through its focus on
practices, deflects engaging with the rights of Aboriginal people as inherently
political rights.8 The scholarly critiques in this area are thorough, and I will not
be adding substantively to them in this article.
2.

Folster v. R. (1997), 148 D.L.R. (4th) 314 at para. 14 (F.C.A.) [Foister].

3.

Being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

4.

Ibid., s. 35(1).

5.

R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 at para. 45 [Sappier].

6.

R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [Van der Peet].

7.

John Borrows, "The Trickster: Integral to a Distinctive Culture" (1997) 8 Const. Forum
Const. 27. See also Chilwin Chienhan Cheng, "Touring the Museum: A Comment on R. v.
Van derPeet" (1997) 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 419; Rosanne Kyle, "Aboriginal Fishing Rights:
The Supreme Court of Canada in the Post-Sparrow Era" (1997) 31 U.B.C. L. Rev. 293.

8.

See e.g. Michael Asch, "The Judicial Conceptualizaton of Culture after Delgamuukw and Van
der Peet" (2000) 5 Rev. Const. Stud. 119 at 133-37; Patrick Macklem, "Distributing
Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples" (1993) 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1311 at 134050; and Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What's Happening?"
(2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 281.
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I will point out, however, that the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) in R v. Sappier; R_ v. Gray9 captured and spoke to at least some of my concerns1" (and to some of those expressed in the scholarly literature) about how the
concept of culture is mobilized in section 35(1) jurisprudence. In Sappier, Justice
Bastarache acknowledged the uneven quality of judicial engagements regarding
what is integral or distinctive to an Aboriginal people's culture. He wrote: "Culture, let alone 'distinctive culture,' has proven to be a difficult concept to grasp for
Canadian courts."" Justice Bastarache posited that part of the difficulty is that
"[u]ltimately, the concept of culture is itself inherently cultural," 2 and he accepted
scholarly criticism that the section 35(1) jurisprudence risked reducing Aboriginal
cultures to "racialized stereotypes"' 3 and "anthropological curiosities.""
Although he did not overrule the Van der Peet test, Justice Bastarache's
comments do present a potential turning point for how Aboriginal culture is
understood in section 35(1) engagements. He expressly acknowledged, and
rejected, the stereotyping that can be engendered from asking questions about
what practices are integral to the cultures of Aboriginal peoples. 5 His comments
may well initiate considerable change in this area of law.
But what about instances where ideas of Aboriginal culture have been incorporated into judicial or policy practices outside of section 35(1) determinations of whether a claimed right is integral to a culture? What about taxation
jurisprudence that contemplates whether property is owned by "an Indian qua
Indian," or just by "an Indian"? The jurisprudence suggests that whatever makes
people Aboriginal is so superficial that it can just be turned on or off, and a judge
can determine whether that on/off switch has been flipped.

9.

Supra note 5.

10.

For a more robust discussion of how l see Sappier as potentially signaling significant changes,
see Constance Maclntosh, "Developments in Aboriginal Law: The 2006-2007 Term" (2007)
38 S.C.L.R. (2d) I at 29-35.

11. Supra note 5 at para. 44.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 45.
Ibid. at para. 42.
Some would argue that, as long as the s. 35(1) test is framed in terms of references to
"culture" instead of political rights, we are asking the wrong questions. See e.g. Gordon
Christie, "A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow,Delgamuukw and Haida
Nation" (2005) 23 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 17; Asch, supra note 8.

MacINTOSH, FROM JUDGING CULTURE TO TAXING "INDIANS"

403

In this article, I trace the language and oppositional concepts that taxation
jurisprudence draws upon, both historically and contemporarily. I find that
there are ways in which Aboriginal individuals' rights and obligations--outside
of the section 35(1) context-have been, and continue to be, determined by an
assessment of whether a person is living an Aboriginal culture, "lifestyle," or
"mode of life." Historically, these assessments have arisen in the law of enfranchisement16 and in policies about whether a child of both Aboriginal and nonAboriginal heritage had to attend residential schools. The assessments have also
arisen expressly in contemporary decisions, including those regarding who has the
rights of an "Indian" for the purpose of interpreting certain agreements between
the Prairie provinces and Canada. The assessments have also arisen in the interpretation of the taxation provisions in the Indian Act,"7 in decisions about the
best interests of Aboriginal children in child welfare cases (as discussed in the
late Marlee Kline's work),18 and in sentencing decisions for Aboriginal persons,
pursuant to the Criminal Code's requirement that sentencing judges give "particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders." 9
This article discusses why using Aboriginal culture as a.measuring stick for
assessing the legal status and rights of Aboriginal people is problematic, both
conceptually and in practice.2" Historically, these rubrics were believed to en-

16.

"Enfranchisement" was the name of the legal process under which Aboriginal persons whom
the state had considered to be "Indian" lost the status of "Indian" and were no longer subject
to the terms of the Indian Act. See Part I(D).

17.

R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5 [IndianAct].

18.

See Marlee Kline, "The Colour of Law: Ideological Representations of First Nations in Legal
Discourse" (1994) 3 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 451. In her study of child welfare decisions, Kline
finds a "judicial tendency to assume that First Nations people who live in urban
environments are not 'real Indians' ... [and so] courts question the ability of urban-dwelling
First Nations people to impart First Nations identity and culture to their children, and this,
in turn, is used to support apprehension and placement decisions" (at 466).

19.

CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.2(e). For a discussion of how Aboriginality is
understood in the context of sentencing decisions, see Margot Hurlbert, "R. v. Moccasin and
the Continued Struggle for Fairness in Aboriginal Sentencing" (2008) 71 Sask. L. Rev. 391
at 409; Brian Pfefferle, "Gladue Sentencing- Uneasy Answers to the Hard Problem of Aboriginal
Over-Incarceration" (2008) 32 Man. L.J. 113 at 126-29. The issues arising from conceptions
of Aboriginal culture in child welfare and sentencing decisions are outside the scope of this article.
I do, however, engage with the other areas I have described because they illustrate a specific trope
or through-line in the discourse that informs contemporary taxation jurisprudence.

20.

For a close reading of how "culture" is problematically deployed in Aboriginal rights cases,
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able state objectives and, therefore, had legitimacy as analytic instruments. For
example, discussions of an Aboriginal individual's "mode of life" in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most often appeared in situations where
a person's legal rights and liabilities depended on whether the person was-in
the eyes of the decision maker-assimilated or still in the process of being assimilated. This was an essential and logical distinction for the colonial state project, as it was primarily those Aboriginal peoples who had not "yet" assimilated
whom the state wished to subject to a distinct legal regime.
In interpreting statutory language that supported the colonial state project,
and which required assessments of an Aboriginal person's "mode of life," courts
developed tests to measure whether an Aboriginal person practised "Aboriginal
culture," or otherwise displayed signs of "Indianness." Although legislative provisions that explicitly required judicial determinations of whether an Aboriginal
person lived "as an Indian" have all been repealed, the common law jurisprudence
has perpetuated these assessments. Indicators that supposedly signal economic
assimilation continue to be used systematically to evaluate the authenticity of
an individual's Aboriginal culture or "Aboriginality." In effect, we are working
with a common law concept of "Indian," which, through its pedigree, grants
both life and legitimacy to assimilation discourse of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
Part I of this article examines the legislation of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, which required a court to consider whether an Aboriginal
person lived an "Indian mode of life." The state goal of assimilation was understood to be attainable through economic assimilation, so a pivotal marker for
identifying whether an Aboriginal individual had assimilated was whether the
individual had entered into the waged or industrialized workforce. I track the
rationale of this requirement to the evolutionary theory of the time, which calibrated social development against economic practices. Participation in the waged
economy and the cash marketplace supposedly signaled that "complete" assimilation had either taken place or was inevitable, and so the person no longer
needed to be recognized and distinguished legally as an "Indian." To illustrate
how assessments of whether a person lives an "Indian mode of life" draw upon
see Asch, supra note 8. See also Ronald Niezen, "Culture and the Judiciary: The Meaning of
the Culture Concept as a Source of Aboriginal Rights in Canada" (2003) 18 C.J.L.S. 1.
Drawing heavily from Asch, Niezen reviews the tensions between anthropological and
judicial conceptions of culture.
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social evolutionary theory, I survey the jurisprudence on the statutory category
of "non-treaty Indians" and administrative decisions about whether to permit
enfranchisement applications.
Thereafter, in Part II, I briefly review policies that admitted M~tis children
to residential schools and examine their reliance on economic oppositions. I
then turn to contemporary jurisprudence that considers whether Mdtis people
are living an "Indian mode of life" for the purpose of the Natural Resource
Transfer Agreements. In Part III, I engage with contemporary taxation jurisprudence. This jurisprudence is significant because, while the current Indian
Act makes no reference to "Indian mode of life,"2 the case law nonetheless
replicates and draws upon the markers that are associated with that concept.
The final Part considers contemporary examples of how the SCC both rejects
and draws upon the organizing rubric of economic oppositions that historically
indexed an "Indian mode of life." This discourse is tenacious, but not totalizing, and, as a consequence, it can be cast off only with conscious effort. This
article is, in part, a call to make that effort.
I wrote this article in the spirit of the work of Catherine Bell and Michael
Asch, which traced how contemporary judicial characterizations of Aboriginal
rights to land are ideologically rooted in deeply racist precedents of the early
twentieth century.22 As noted above, however, my analysis avoids engaging with
section 35(1) in favour of less studied areas of law. This approach seems especially appropriate in light of how the reasons in Sappier may modify section
35(1) analyses. I am also influenced by the work of the late social justice advocate, Marlee Kline, who called for tracing and challenging the "continuing presence of ideological representations of Indianness and their effects in ... areas of
legal discourse ' 23 as a tactic for confronting the "power and authority accorded
to legal actors and institutions to define First Nations and impose destructive
regimes upon them." 2 This article takes up her call in identifying how oppressive
ideologies continue to be reinforced within legal discourse.

21.

See supra note 17.

22.

Catherine Bell & Michael Asch, "Challenging Assumptions: The Impact of Precedent in
Aboriginal Rights Litigation" in Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginaland Treaty Rights in Canada
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 38.

23.
24.

Supra note 18 at 468.
Ibid. at 469.
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I. SOURCING THE PRESENT IN THE PAST
A.

DISTINCTIONS TO PROTECT AND ENABLE ASSIMILATION

It is generally understood that legislators in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries drafted early Canadian Indian policy to pursue several intertwined
objectives.25 One was to "gradually civilize," or assimilate, Aboriginal people. A
second was to "protect" Aboriginal people until they were successfully assimilated
(and thus deemed able to protect themselves).26 State officials had to know when
they could withdraw paternal protective measures, which involved a distinct
set of legal obligations and disabilities. Otherwise, from the perspective of state
officials, these measures could turn into a lingering advantage for-or, alternately,
cause prejudice to-an "assimilated Indian" in his or her activities. Aboriginal
people who were members of bands or treaty groups-and so had a right to live
on reserved land-could be identified through community membership or by
where they lived. However, some Aboriginal people did not have such clear affiliations, 27 potentially keeping them outside the colonial project.
The historic Indian Act category of a "non-treaty Indian" was drafted to
capture such populations. A "non-treaty Indian" was defined as a person with
"Indian blood" who did not belong to any recognized band or treaty group,
but who "lived an Indian mode of lifI."25 The cffect of the definition was that

persons who had Aboriginal (or a combination of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal)

25.

See Sidney L. Harring, White Man s Law: Native People in Nineteenth-Century Canadian
Jurisprudence(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 31-34; Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol, 1: Looking Forward,Looking Back (Ottawa: Canada
Communication Group, 1996) at 263 [Report ofthe Royal Commission]; and John L. Tobias,
"Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy" in
James Rodger Miller, ed., Sweet Promises:A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 127 at 127.

26.

See Harring, ibid. Harring observes that, by' "[l]egally holding Indians in this condition [of
being placed into a distinct legal category], the government could subject them to unique
forms of social control, educate and Christianize them, and 'gradually' train them for the full
responsibilities of citizenship" (at 33).
For a discussion of various circumstances that would have led to such a result, see Wendy
Cornet, "Aboriginaliry: Legal Foundations, Past Trends, Future Prospects" in Joseph Eliot
Magnet & Dwight A. Dorey, eds., AboriginalRights Litigation (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada,
2003) 121 at 129-31.

27.

28.

An Act to Amend and Consolidatethe Laws Respecting Indians,S.C. 1876, c. 18 [IndianAct(1876)].
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heritage, but who were not part of a group already recognized as "Indian" by
the state apparatus, could be subjected to certain terms of the Indian Act.29 As
Andrew Armitage observed in his comparison of Aboriginal assimilation policies in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, identification "was integral to oneway assimilation. ... Being defined as Indian ..'. was intended to determine to
whom assimilationist social policies should be applied."" Legislators shaped the
definition of "non-treaty Indian" to ensure that a distinctive legal regime embraced all Aboriginal persons who still had to be assimilated into the European
economic order. However, they did not intend to impose a regime upon all
persons who happened to be of Aboriginal ancestry.
B. MODE OF LIFE
The Indian Act's statutory directive to consider the "mode of life" of certain
Aboriginal persons as the key criterion for assessing whether they counted as
"Indian"-instead of considering, for example, whether a person self-identified
as Aboriginal or "Indian"-resonated with the social theory of the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries. The phrase "mode of life" is linked to the
scholarly work of political and social theorists who sought to understand the
origin and development of human societies. Although there is some variation,
most theorists of the time identified. developmental hierarchies or stages through
which human societies evolved within a positivistic and unilineal framework.
One of the more influential approaches came from anthropologist Lewis
Henry Morgan. He identified three stages of human social evolution, which can
be gleaned from the tide of his seminal 1877 work, Ancient Society, Or Research in
the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization."
"Civilization ' was, essentially, Western European society. Scholars like Michael
Asch, who have studied the period, have observed that "this form of reasoning was
dominant" well into the nineteenth century, both in social as well as judicial theory.32

29.

For the legislative origin of "non-treaty Indians," see Robert K. Groves, "The Curious
Instance of the Irregular Band: A Case Study of Canada's Missing Recognition Policy"
(2007) 70 Sask. L. Rev. 153.

30.

Andrew Armitage, Comparingthe Policy ofAboriginalAssimilation:Australia, Canada,and
New Zealand (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995) at 86.

31.

See Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society, Or Researches in the Lines of Human Progressfrom
Savagery through Barbarismto Civilization (London: Macmillan & Company, 1877).

32.

Asch, supra note 8 at 127. Asch notes that, although this approach was dominant, it was also
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The penetration of these concepts into the common sense of the common
law is, perhaps, best illustrated in the 1919 decision Re Southern Rhodesia.33 In
that case, the Privy Council described the Indigenous litigants as being "so low
[on] the scale of social organization that their usages and conceptions of rights
and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions or the legal ideas of
civilized society."3 The evolutionary scale was present in the judicial imagination well into the 1920s, and was used to substantiate conclusions about the
political character and rights of an Indigenous people.
Morgan linked these stages of civilizational development to technological
change. In particular, he theorized that technological progress was what enabled
social progress and allowed movement up the ladder-stage by stage-towards
civilization. Morgan's work resonated with that of other influential writers of the
time, including Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Indeed, some consider Marx
and Engels to have developed the organizing phrase "mode of life," 35 although
this concept may also have roots in the liberal political economy writings of
Adam Smith. 6 These social theorists argued that human societies could be
meaningfully categorized and placed on a developmental ladder according to
how they produced their mode of production-that is, how they organized for
the purpose of subsistence. Marx and Engels wrote:
The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on
the nature of the actual means they find in existence... . This mode of production
...[is] a definite mode of life
on their part. As individuals express their life, so they
are. What they are, therefore, coincides
with their production, both with what they
37
produce and how they produce.

Marx theorized that each "certain mode of production, or industrial stage,
is always combined with a certain ...social stage,"3 and that, together, they
identify a mode of life. Thus, the phrase "mode of life" reflects theories of pocriticized by contemporaneous scholars of culture, such as Bronislaw Malinowski.
33.

11919] A.C. 211 (P.C.).

34. Ibid. at 233.
35.

See Bradley E. Ensor, "Social Formations, Modo de Vida, and Conflict in Archaeology"
(2000) 65 Am. Antiquity 15 at 17.

36.

Cf William Roseberry, "Political Economy" (1988) 17 Ann. Rev. Anthropol. 161.

37.

Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers,
1947) at 7 [emphasis in original].

38.

Ibid. at 18 [emphasis added].

MacINTOSH, FROM JUDGING CULTURE TO TAXING "INDIANS"

409

litical economy: by looking to the material factors of what a person produces
and the material means by which he or she produces, one can identify a "mode
of life" that determines an individual's placement within the evolution of human societies.
The European economic practices of establishing permanent settlements,
clearing land for agriculture, sequestering allotments of land as fee simple property, and cultivating and harvesting resources for both personal needs and market needs elsewhere, would have been incompatible with the practices of many
Aboriginal people.39 Indeed, as the Report of the Royal Commission commented,
given the differences in their approaches to natural resources and the land in
general, "Aboriginal people came to be regarded as impediments to productive
development. '' "O Aboriginal economies-which were largely outside of a cash
workforce-were believed to be at a different and lower evolutionary stage than
Euro-Canadian wage-based economies. In this context, the state objective of
assimilation could only be achieved by engaging Aboriginal people in the European economic order and creating conditions for "accelerating" their social evolution so that they could compete with Euro-Canadians within that order. 1 To
assess "mode of life" was to ask what sort of economic activities an Aboriginal
individual engaged in. This was a logical (if racist) exercise to enable the state to
determine whether individual "non-treaty Indians" were already assimilated into
the industrial "mode of life." If they were still living more like "Indians," they
would need to be subjected to the restraints and protections of the assimilation
apparatus.
C. ASSESSING "MODE OF LIFE"
Cases where a judge applied the legislation and assessed the "mode of life" of
alleged "non-treaty Indians" tended to focus on whether the facts indicated an
adoption of European economic practices. The most robust body of reported
jurisprudence involved trials brought against shopkeepers who were accused of
selling alcohol to "non-treaty Indians." Various incarnations of the Indian Act
prohibited the sale of alcohol to "non-treaty Indians," under threat of fines or

39.

See Report of the Royal Commission, supra note 25 at 138.

40. Ibid.
41.

Ibid. at 263.
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jail time. The outcome of the charge against the shopkeeper would depend on
whether there was evidence supporting or refuting the fact that the Aboriginal
customer lived an "Indian mode of life."
In R. v. Mellon, 3 for example, a shopkeeper was charged with selling alcohol
to a "non-treaty Indian." The shopkeeper argued that the customer did not live
an "Indian mode of life" because of his appearance, demeanour, and employment in the cash economy. The court considered his evidence refuting the allegation that the customer, referred to as the "half-breed," lived an "Indian mode
of life":
[Hie never dressed like an Indian; ... [he worked] freighting between Calgary and
Edmonton for two summers; ... he never wore moccasins; [and] he was driving a
pair of horses and selling posts the day he got the liquor. In fact, [the purchaser]
speaks English fluently and dresses better than many ordinary white men; there is
no indication whatsoever in his appearance, in his language, or in his general de-

meanour, that he does not belong to the better class of half-breeds [who do not
live the Indian mode of life].4"

These statements contrast understandings of markers of "Indianness" with
those of "whiteness"-of living an "Indian mode of life" versus participating in
the colonial economic order. In particular, the last statement in the quoted passage grounds this contrast in a hierarchy of social evolution with the identification of there being a "better" (and, thus, also a lesser) "class of half-breeds." Similarly, in R. v. Hughes, s the Crown argued that an Aboriginal purchaser lived an
"Indian mode of life" because the purchaser either lived on an Indian reserve or
"fished and lived in a tent. '"' Living on a reserve, or in non-permanent housing
outside the waged economy, demonstrated an "Indian mode of life." In the 1914
case R. v. Verdi,47 the purchaser allegedly abandoned the "Indian mode of life"
because there was evidence that he was "living as an ordinary white citizen, paying municipal taxes, etc. "48
These cases demonstrate the ways in which the judiciary determined whether
42.

Indian Act (1876), supra note 28, s. 79.

43. (1900), 7 C.C.C. 179 (N.W.T.S.C.) [Mellon].
44. Ibid.at 180-81.
45. (1906), 4 W.L.R. 431 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
46. Ibid.at 432.
47. (1914), 23 C.C.C. 47 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
48. Ibid. at 48 (quoting the headnote).
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an Aboriginal person was living an "Indian mode of life" during the first few
decades of the twentieth century. There was a clear dichotomy between what
"white" people did and what "Indians" were expected to do. Evidence that
an
Aboriginal person was participating in the cash economy was used to prove that
the person had abandoned the "Indian way of life.4 9 Although the court drew
upon other indicators (such as language), these cases emphasized oppositions
between waged and non-waged work, and between living on and living off a
reserve. These oppositions persist in today's jurisprudence as key organizational
indicators of "Indianness."
D. BECOMING "OF WHITE STATUS"
Much has been written about the former provisions of the Indian Act under
which an Aboriginal person-whom the state had recognized as an "Indian"could lose the legal obligations, rights, and limitations of being an "Indian.""5
These provisions persisted in various forms from 1869"1 until 1985.2 The legislation called this process "becoming enfranchised," and only the state could assess whether or not the enfranchisement criteria had been met. Indeed, under

49.

For an intriguing discussion of the role of waged work in the lives of Aboriginal peoples of
British Columbia during this period, see Rolf Knight, Indians at Work: An Informal History
of Native Labour in British Columbia, 1858-1930 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1996) at 20.
Knight observes that "[vlirtually all Indian adults were employed in some way" in the waged
economy, and that both Aboriginal as well as white labourers tended to engage in seasonal work.

50.

See e.g. Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, "Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the
Canadian State for First Nations Women" in Caroline Andrew & Sandra Rodgers, eds.,
Women and the Canadian State (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977) 64 at 66.
Turpel-Lafond writes: "The expression, 'Indian,' is an alien one. It is a term imposed by the
colonial governments. ... First Nations people ...
have names for our peoples. ... The word
'Indian' denies and effaces the diversity of our peoples." For critical discussions of the history
of the term "Indian" and other state efforts at defining Indigenous peoples, see Cornet, supra
note 27 at 121-29; Bonita Lawrence, "Gender, Race and the Regulation of Native Identity in
Canada and the United States: An Overview" (2003) 18 Hypatia 3; and D'Arcy Vermette,
"Colonialism and the Process of Defining Aboriginal People" (2008) 31 Dal. L.J. 211.

51.

An Actfor the GradualEnfranchisementof Indians,the BetterManagement ofIndian Affairs,
and to Extend the Provisionsof the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42, S.C. 1869, c. 6, ss. 16-19
[IndianAct (1869)].
See Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6 [IndianAct (1970)]. See also Robin Jarvis Brownlie, "'A
better citizen than lots of white men': First Nations Enfranchisement - An Ontario Case
Study, 1918-1940" (2006) 87 Can. Hist. Rev. 29.

52.
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the Indian Acis 1869 manifestation, 3 an Aboriginal person who asserted that
he or she had become enfranchised without first obtaining state endorsement
5
was guilty of an offense and subject to imprisonment. 4
Enfranchisement legislation-like the jurisprudence that considered whether
an alleged "non-treaty Indian" lived an Indian mode of life-calibrated rights,
entitlement, and identity against social and economic practices, and the values
and capacities that those practices presumably reflected. The Indian Act (1876)
associated enfranchisement with the question of whether Aboriginal individuals
had proven that they had obtained a sufficient "degree of civilization ... to become a proprietor of land in fee simple.""5 There was a deemed correlation between losing one's "Indianness" and gaining capacity to own private property. 6
This correlation was also foundational in Morgan's writing (although his writing
appeared almost a decade after enfranchisement legislation was enacted). Morgan
wrote that having the idea of private property "marks the commencement of
civilization,""7 and so was a key threshold that signaled when a person or group
is passing out of one socio-evolutionary stage and into the next. The evolutionary
hierarchy was clear: those who were "Indians" presumably could not be capable
of owning and working land, but could, with the right inducements, progress
to the point of being able to do so. If this occurred, they could leave life on reserved land behind them and move into the realm of private property ownership,
which included participation in the cash economy.
Under the legislation, when Aboriginal persons became enfranchised, they
were no longer legally distinguishable from other British subjects and would
"no longer be deemed Indians within the meaning of the laws relating to Indians." 8 Robin Brownlie extensively reviewed internal correspondence among
officials of the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) who decided whether to

53.

Indian Act (1869), supra note 51.

54.

Ibid.,s. 19.

55.
56.

Indian Act (1876), supra note 28, s. 86.
This position persists, in a modified form, in the contemporary writing of Tom Flanagan
and Christopher Alcantara. See e.g. "Individual Property Rights on Canadian Indian
Reserves" (2004) 29 Queen's L.J. 489 (arguing that on-reserve poverty is the result of reserve
lands being held under a regime which impedes individuals from being able to effectively
exercise private property rights).

57.

Morgan, supra note 31 at 6.

58.

Indian Act (1869), supra note 51, s. 19.
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grant enfranchisement. His archival work uncovered letters that refused applications for enfranchisement due to the finding that the Aboriginal applicant
"would not be able to take his place as a white man."59 In a similar vein, Brownlie
uncovered DIA correspondence that required those becoming enfranchised to
be "able to compete with whites,"6" or be able to support one's family "in a reasonable degree of comfort in competition with white people."61 Brownlie also
found enfranchisement certificates that certified that the applicant "[from] that
date on is of white status."62
Following the common sense of the time, if Aboriginal persons were judged
capable of supporting themselves in the cash economy, it meant they had been
assimilated and were no longer in need of a unique legislative regime. Not surprisingly, Brownlie characterized enfranchisement as a process where "First
Nations people were ... being legally transformed from Indians into whites."63
The legislative amendments of 1885 introduced the category of "probationary Indian."" At this point, the statute required not just evidence that the person
seeking enfranchisement had obtained an appropriate "degree of civilization,"
but also evidence that he or she, once given the chance, would develop land.
The "probationary Indian" received a temporary grant of land and was under
surveillance for three years. After this time, if the Superintendent-General was
satisfied that the "probationary Indian" had made adequate progress towards
improving the land, then enfranchisement and a grant of the land in fee simple
would follow. Sufficient assimilation for the purposes of the state project (such
that the status of "Indian" was no longer necessary or appropriate) rested on
one's ability to see and consume land as a private capital resource.65 This again
resonated with Morgan's social theory.

59.

Brownlie, supra note 52 at 45.

60.

Ibid. at 33.

61.

Ibid. at 47.

62.

Ibid.

63.

Ibid. at 30.

64. IndianAct (1867), supra note 28, ss. 87-88.
65.

The expectation of modifying the land was further brought to the forefront in 1919, when
the IndianAct was amended to allow for the creation of enfranchisement boards, whose
terms required them to consider and report upon "the land occupied by each Indian ... and
the improvements thereon," among other things. See An Act to Amend the Indian Act, S.C.
1919-1920, c. 50, s. 3.
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The ElectoralFranchiseAc?' also identified improvements to land as evidence
that an Aboriginal person was moving beyond the "Indian mode of life" and
towards being able to participate in "white" society. The Act was brought into
force the same year that the "probationary Indian" category was created. It
granted the right to vote to "Indians" who were "in possession and occupation
of a separate and distinct tract of land in such reserve ...and whose improveof the value of at least one hundred and fifty
ments on such separate tract are ...
67
dollars."
Similar provisions persisted in various forms of the enfranchisement legislation over the next few decades. The penultimate amendment, which was in force
from 1918 to 1951, allowed enfranchisement to any "Indian" who did not reside on a reserve and did "not follow the Indian mode of life."68 It signaled a
continuing association between "Indian mode of life," living on a reserve, and
being insufficiently assimilated into "white" society. The last amendment, in
force from 1951 to 1985, dropped the reference to "mode of life." Instead, the
legislation made enfranchisement contingent on finding that the "Indian" was
"capable of assuming the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, and ...[was]
capable of supporting himself and his dependents."69 This latter requirement
resonated with the concerns that the DIA had expressed in its correspondence at
the turn of the nineteenth century: whether applicants would be able to support
their families if they were no longer shielded from the marketplace, but rather
were in competition with whites within a cash-based economy. And so, as of
1985, the measurement for proving assimilation-that persons should "no longer
be deemed Indians within the meaning of the laws relating to Indians" 7remained calibrated against an economic ordering that echoes with nineteenthcentury theories of social evolution.

66.

ElectoralFranchiseAct, S.C. 1885, c. 40.

67. Ibid.,s. II(c).
68.

An Act to Amend the IndianAct, S.C. 1918, c. 26, s. 6 (inserting s. 112A to the Indian Act
(1906)). Because this provision was never litigated, there is no case law interpreting it.

69.

Indian Act (1970), supra note 52, s. 109 (the last iteration of enfranchisement provisions).
These provisions were later repealed. See An Act to Amend the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985 (lst
Supp.), c. 32, s. 20.

70.

Indian Act (1869), supra note 51, s. 16.
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II. "SETTLED" VERSUS "INDIAN" MODES OF LIFE
A. DISTINGUISHING THE CHILDREN
M~tis people, like "non-treaty Indians," posed a conundrum for the state. There
is considerable scholarly literature regarding state machinations over M~tis people and whether M~tis people ought to be treated as "Indians" for the purpose
of law and policy."' The typical outcome of such machinations is evidenced by
the assertion of Lieutenant Governor Alexander Morris around 1880. In the
context of settling treaties with Aboriginal inhabitants of the Prairie provinces,
he stated: "They must be either white or Indian. If Indians, they get treaty
money; if the Half-breeds call themselves white, they get land.""
Reports on the residential school system show a similar policy for assessing
whether M~tis children should attend the schools. The residential school system
operated as industrial schools that emphasized training in trades, and had the
goal of placing graduating children outside of reserve communities and within.
the waged labour market.7 3 To this end, M6tis children were sorted into two
categories: children who, according to the state, required residential school to
enable their assimilation and those who did not. Children who were "living an
Indian mode of life" would be considered for admission. Children whose families lived what was referred to as a "settled mode of life" were generally not required-or, due to cost to the government, not permitted -to attend.7
Essentially, the decision to admit children to the schools was based on
whether the M~tis children were living too much like Indians. If so, then they
71.

72.

73.
74.

See e.g. Cornet, supra note 27 at 142; Larry N. Chartrand, "Are We M~tis or Are We Indians?
A Commentary on R. v. Grumbo" (2000) 31 Ottawa L. Rev. 267; and Catherine Bell, "Who
are the M~tis People in Section 35(2)?" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 351. This confusion certainly
persisted until 2003, when the SCC recognized M~tis as distinct rights-bearing people (as
opposed to being communities whose rights derived from their founding Aboriginal ancestors'
cultural practices). See R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207. This approach has attracted
considerable scholarly attention for its erasure of M~tis history and culture. See e.g. Catherine
Bell & Clayton Leonard, "A New Era in M~tis Constitutional Rights: The Importance of
Powley and Blais" (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 1049.
Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canadawith the Indians of Manitoba and the NorthWest Territories, Including the Negotiations on Which they Were Based and Other Information
Relating Thereto (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke & Co., 1880) at 69.
Report of the Royal Commission, supra note 25 at 337.
Larry N. Chartrand, Tricia E. Logan & Judy D. Daniels, Mtis History and Experience and
Residential Schools in Canada(Ottawa: Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2006) at 75.
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were "in need of civilization"75 so that they could assimilate effectively into the
European-style economic order. A DIA policy memo from 1913 stated: "[Children] of mixed blood ...whose parents on either side live as Indians ...should

be eligible for admission."76 Correspondence up to the 1940s reflected this criterion, and the written reasons for admitting Mtis children consistently referred
to their parents as "living the Indian mode of life." 77
What did that "mode of life" look like? In most of the correspondence that
Larry Chartrand, Tricia Logan, and Jody Daniels retrieved from archival databases in their extensive review of the M6tis residential school experience, the
meaning of "Indian mode of life" was seen as so self-evident that no further description was needed. Some correspondence expanded the description with reference to a family being "destitute" or living off the running of a trap line (which
78
presumably signalled non-participation in the regular waged economy).
Identifying a Mtis person who lived an "Indian mode of life" for the purpose of residential school enrollment was, for the most part, an exercise in racism.
It involved calibrating the perceived socio-economic practices of Aboriginal individuals against a norm associated with industrialized European-descended settlers.
Based upon this calibration, it identified who was in need of socio-industrial
evolutionary assistance, and who had advanced beyond needing protections and
could compete "as white men." Dcrsons who livc- an "Indian mode of life" did
not aggressively clear and cultivate the land, were not engaged in waged labour,
and tended to be destitute.
B. DESTITUTION AND THE "INDIAN MODE OF LIFE"
The phrase "Indian mode of life," and all its sweeping implications about what
can or cannot be generalized, is also found in more recent decisions regarding
the application of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements (NRTAs)."9 The

75. Ibid. at 19.

76. Ibid. at 117 [emphasis added].
77. Ibid.at 118.
78.

Ibid.at 118-19.

79. ManitobaNatural Resources TransferAgreement (1930), being Schedule 1 to the Constitution
Act, 1930 (U.K.), 20-21 Geo. V., c. 26, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11,No. 26, s. 13;
Alberta NaturalResources Transfer Agreement (1930), being Schedule I to the Constitution Act

1930 (U.K.), 20-21 Geo. V, c. 26, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11,No. 26, s. 12; and
Saskatcbewan Natural Resources TransferAgreement (1930), being Schedule I to the
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NRTAs are a series of agreements that Canada entered into with each of the
three Prairie provinces in 1929 and 1930. These agreements were made to
address the fact that, at Confederation, the federal government retained jurisdiction over public lands and resources within the provinces.8" The agreements
transfer jurisdiction from the federal government to the respective provincial
governments. All three agreements include identical terms, stating that the
"Indians" of each Prairie province would have the right to hunt, trap, and fish
for food year-round on unoccupied Crown lands and other lands to which they
had a right of access.
The question of whether persons who self-identify as Mtis are "Indian"
for the purpose of the NRTAs has been litigated on several occasions, most recently in 2003.81 In interpreting the NRTAs, courts have used the definition of
"Indian" found in the 1927'version of the Indian Act,82 because this version was
inforce when the agreements were made. As discussed above, the Indian Act
(1927) defined "non-treaty Indian" as including "any person of Indian blood
83
who follows the Indian mode of life."
...
The last few decades of jurisprudence regarding whether a Mtis person is
an "Indian" for the purposes of the NRTAs have tended to define "Indian"
modes of life through findings of economic destitution and inconsistent cash
employment. The cases illuminate the entrenched character of these racist
Constitution Act 1930 (U.K.), 20-21 Geo. V, c. 26, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.
26, s. 12. For an in-depth legal-historical analysis of the NRTAs, see Frank J. Tough, "The
Forgotten Constitution: The Natural Resources Transfer Agreements and Indian Livelihood
Rights" (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 999.
80.

Mark Stevenson, "Section 91(24) and Canada's Legislative Jurisdiction with Respect to the
Mtis" (2002) 1 Indigenous L.J. 237 at 257-58.

81.

The SCC has now determined that the NRTA between Manitoba and Canada was not
intended to include M~tis people under the category of "Indians." See R. v. Blais, [2003] 2
S.C.R. 236 [Blais]. However, the Court's finding turned on the fact that the two
governments had historically distinguished between the identities and legal rights of Mdtis
and those of Indian communities. As a result, the governments would not have intended the
term "Indian" in the NRTA to embrace Mitis. The Court wrote: "The difference between
Indians and M~tis appears to have been widely recognized and understood by the midnineteenth century.... Government actors and the M~tis themselves viewed the Indians as a
separate group" (at para. 21). No such assessment has been made for the sister agreements in
Alberta and Saskatchewan. See Bell & Leonard, supra note 71 at paras. 29-31.

82.

Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98 [IndianAct (1927)].

83. Ibid., s.2(h).
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markers of "Indianness" within contemporary common law. For example, in
the 1993 case of R. v. Ferguson," the M~tis defendant was charged with hunting
without a licence and unlawful possession of wildlife. However, the Alberta
Provincial Court found that the defendant fell under the NRTA, based on the
definition of "non-treaty Indian" in the Indian Act (1927). Evidence that the
defendant lived an "Indian mode of life" included his having grown up in an
isolated Cree-speaking community and his first language having been Cree.
The court found that "[flood was obtained by hunting and gathering. The
usual Cree Indian customs were followed in respect to philosophy of life and
lifestyle."85 This all led the court to find that "the defendant [was] an Indian in
86
terms of culture."
The Crown appealed the decision to the Alberta Queen's Bench. The
Crown's key argument was that the defendant was not living an "Indian mode
of life," as his "current lifestyle ... [included] running tractors and building
roads."87 The Crown argued that engaging in these waged labour practices was
sufficient both to eviscerate any claim that the defendant lived an "Indian mode
of life" and to trump the relevance of language practices and assertions of personal philosophy. The Queen's Bench dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding
that these employment activities were too "casual or intermittent [a] lifestyle
pursuit"88 to jeopardize the defendant's status.
The Alberta Queen's Bench analysis in Ferguson is disappointing on several
levels. First, it follows from the court's reasons that, had the defendant been regularly employed as a farm laborer or construction worker, this would have been
sufficient to have eroded his claim as "an Indian in terms of culture," despite
the fact that he followed "usual Cree Indian customs ... in respect to philosophy of life and lifestyle."89 Although the Indian Act (1927) required an assessment of "Indian mode of life," the court in 1994 was not required to draw upon
Euro-Canadian ideas of "Indian mode of life" from the turn of the twentieth
century.
84.

[1993] 2 C.N.L.R. 148 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) [Ferguson trial decision], affd [1994] 1 C.N.L.R
117 (Alta. Q.B.) [Ferguson Queen's Bench decision].
0

85.

Ferguson trial decision, ibid. at para. 19.

86. Ibid. at para. 20.
87. Ferguson Queen's Bench decision, supra note 84 at para. 17.

88. Ibid
89. Ferguson trial decision, supra note 84 at para. 19.
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It is also disappointing because the court refrained from addressing the defendant's argument that the proper meaning of "Indian" should not be derived
from the various Indian Act definitions." Counsel argued that the court should
instead "establish the 'Indian' characterization of Mr. Ferguson"" through a
broader consideration of the meaning of Aboriginality and through reference to
other instruments, such as section 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982. Given that
the term "Indian mode of life" was statutorily mandated as a consideration, the
defendant's proposition could have modernized the court's approach and
brought it in line with contemporary understandings of Aboriginality-ones
that would include bringing Aboriginal people into the dialogue in which they
are being defined.
The Alberta Queen's Bench chose not to explore the merits of this argument
because it found that the lower court's decision in favour of the defendant could
stand. Although faced with an opportunity to consider the legitimacy of a judicial framework that relied on racist social evolutionary theory to inform constitutional interpretation, the court remained silent because the facts satisfied the
racist framework that upheld the acquittal. While the defendant was exonerated,
in following this course of action, the court joined the line of those who have
reproduced, and so have legitimized, conceptions of "Indianness" and Aboriginal
culture that served the colonial project.
The court's reasons could have been written just as readily at the beginning
of the twentieth century in an administrative decision about whether a Mkis
child would be required to attend a residential school, or in a judicial determination of whether a shopkeeper had correctly judged that a M&is client was of
"the better class of half-breeds."92 The 1995 NRTA case of R. v. Desjarlais"
3
90.

The defendant's counsel may have been drawing upon the extensive commentary on the
damages caused to Aboriginal individuals, families, and communities by the definitions of
"Indians" within the IndianAct, as well as the connections between the definitions and the
racist colonial project. See Dwight A. Dorey, "The Future of Off-Reserve Aboriginal
Peoples" in Magnet & Dorey, supra note 27, 11. He states: "The IndianAct imposes on our
people an archaic caste system ... [which] distorts the perception of Canadians about
Aboriginal issues. It also distorts the perceptions of Indian Act bands" (at 17). See also
Pamela Palmater, "An Empty Shell of a Treaty Promise: R. v. Marshalland the Rights of
Non-Status Indians" (2000) 23 Dal. L.J. 102 at 117-20.

91.

Ferguson Queen's Bench decision, supra note 84 at para. 11.

92.

Mellon, supra note 43 at 181.

93.

[1995] A.J. No. 1324 (Prov. Ct.) [Desjarlais];affd [1995] A.J. No. 1320 (Q.B.).
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showed similar stereotyping. The case involved two Mtis who were charged
with hunting out of season on Crown land. The trial judge concluded: "It will
clearly be more difficult to show an Indian mode of life where a person has had
protracted employment in locations and in environments making it difficult to
maintain traditional cultural and family ties."" In this particular case, an "Indian
mode of life" was made out because the court only had "evidence of part-time,
casual type employment on the part of this Accused."" With regard to the coaccused, the court concluded that he currently "enjoys and follows an Indian
life style"96 as he "has only limited part-time employment to date"9" and has
been subjected to "limited outside influences."" The court stated that, in the
future, outside influences like "location and employment may act to dilute or
extinguish his actual Indian life style or his present Indian life style state of
mind."9 In effect, the court found that an "Indian mode of life" is characterized and maintained by having a marginal employment history and living in
borderline destitution.
The courts should be particularly conscious of importing past prejudices or
stereotypes in such cases because the NRTAs are part of the Constitution. In R.
0
v.Blais,"'
the SCC specifically discussed the consequences of the NRTAs being
constitutional documents. It wrote: "A court interpreting a constitutionally
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of the guarantee and thus secure 'for individuals the full benefit of the [constitutional] protection."'. This approach is required because "one of the most
fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation [is] ...that
our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation,
accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life."'0 2 The way constitutional documents are interpreted must change and progress in a liberal fashion
in response to changing situations or values. This approach is necessary to "[en94.

Desjarlais,ibid. at para. 22.

95.

Ibid.

96.

Ibid.at para. 21.

97. Ibid.
98.

Ibid.

99. Ibid.
100. Blais, supra note 81.
101. Ibid. atpara. 17.
102. Re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 at para. 22.
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sure] the continued relevance and, indeed, legitimacy of Canada's constituting
document." ' 3 The principle that interpretations must "evolve and must be tailored to the changing political and cultural realities of Canadian society" applies
to all parts of the Constitution"' and has been firmly in place since at least
1930.0' When interpreting and applying constitutional instruments, "[l]egislative
history provides a starting point ... [but] it is seldom conclusive as to the scope
of that competence for legislative competence is essentially dynamic."" 6
Indeed, in Edwards v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada"7 (often called the Persons Case), the government argued that the understanding of the term "persons,"
as of 1867, was definitionally incorporated into the ConstitutionAct, 1867, and so
ought to govern any provisions of the instrument that used that term. Given the
prejudices of 1867, this would mean that women could never be "persons" for
the purpose of taking political office. The Privy Council rejected this argument as
offensive for its "frozen" character, finding the understanding of the capacity of
women, as reflected in 1867, to be a "relic of days more barbarous than ours,"0 8
and to have no place in contemporary constitutional interpretation.
Surely, one would expect that an understanding of Aboriginal peoples' cultures, as existing in opposition to, or somehow eroded by, engaging in regular
waged work, is a similarly unacceptable "relic of days more barbarous than ours,"
from a time when Western thought subscribed to social evolutionary theory and
followed a rubric that depended upon distinctions between industrial economic
practices and others. Yet courts continue to draw oppositions between what is
"Indian" and what is "white," where an "Indian mode of life" or "state of mind"
is, by definition, displaced or placed at risk by regular waged employment. Are
Aboriginal cultural practices really so incompatible with holding down a paying
job that being employed can reasonably be assumed to undermine who an Abo103. Ibid. at para. 23. See also Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at para.
94; Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 at 1029; Re Residential
Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 at 723; Law Society of Upper Canadav. Skapinker,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 365; and Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 155.
104. CanadianWestern Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 23.
105. See Edwards v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 136 [Edwards].
106. Martin Service Station v. MNR, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 996 at 1006. See also Re BCMotor Vehicle
Act [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at paras. 46-52 (where Lamer J. found for the majority that, while
legislative history was admissible, it was to have little weight).
107. Edwards, supra note 105.
108. Ibid. at 128.
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riginal person is? Are the cultures of Aboriginal people so fragile that they can
only take one form?" 9 As I have shown, the conceptual origin of these propositions rests in social evolutionary theory, which deemed Aboriginal economies to
be at a different and lower evolutionary stage than the Euro-Canadian wage-based
economy. These propositions were foundational for legitimating the colonial
project and justifying state treatment of Aboriginal persons. These propositions
have since been roundly discredited as racist and harmful, and assimilation is no
longer a state goal; yet contemporary judicial reasoning continues to perpetuate
these myths when interpreting statutory language.
In the NRTA examples above, the legislation required the decision maker
to consider the "mode of life" of the Aboriginal person. I turn now to situations
where the judiciary is under no such obligation because the legislation does not
impose any such requirement: the jurisprudence regarding the taxation and
garnishment provisions of the Indian Act.

III. TAXING "INDIANS"
A. THE MITCHELL DECISION
The perpetuation of a turn-of-the-century concept of "Indianness," which defines Aboriginality or "living an Indian mode of life" through suppositions of
pre-capitalist economic markers, is consistently found in decisions regarding
statutory exemptions from taxation and garnishment under the current Indian
Act.' The key provisions read, in part:
87(1). Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament or any Act of the legislature
of a province ...the following property is exempt from taxation:
(a) the interest of an Indian or a band in reserve lands or surrendered lands; and
(b) the personal property of an Indian or a band situated on a reserve.
87(2). No Indian or band is subject to taxation in respect of the ownership, occupation, possession or use of any property mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) or is
otherwise subject to taxation in respect of any such property.
109. For a thoughtful analysis of why these conceptions must be fought, see John Borrows,
"Physical Philosophy: Mobility and the Future of Indigenous Rights" [Borrows, "Physical Philosophy"] in Benjamin J. Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds., Indigenous Peoples
and the Law: Comparativeand CriticalPerspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 403.
110. For a general history of the suite of statutory provisions regarding taxation, see J. Peter
Ranson, "The Evolution of Aboriginal Tax Exemptions: The Past, the Present, and the
Future" (2005) Can. Tax. Found. 75.
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89(1). Subject to this Act, the real and personal property of an Indian or a band
situated on a reserve is not subject to charge, pledge, mortgage, attachment, levy,
seizure, distress or execution.... 11
These exemptions are unique. 1 2 In Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band,"3 the
SCC explored the source and purpose of these provisions, and identified the
practice of recognizing or granting taxation, garnishment, and seizure exemptions as dating back to colonial Indian policies. For example, the Royal Proclamation, 1763" assured Aboriginal peoples that the Crown would "protect
'
them in the possession and use of such lands as were reserved for their use."115
It
also guaranteed that Aboriginal peoples would not be dispossessed of any benefits that "they had retained or might acquire pursuant to the fulfillment by the
Crown of its treaty obligations." ' 6
The statutory language of the Indian Act goes beyond shielding reserved
lands and treaty benefits. It also embraces the broad category of "personal property," while imposing several unique restrictions on scope. One of these restrictions is section 87(1)(b), which provides that the personal property must be "of
an Indian ... on a reserve." Ostensibly, this provision links the exemption to a
geographic location (reserved land), and to owners who are "Indians" (with the
term "Indian" logically referring to those who fall under the definition of "In17
dian" that is provided within the same statute).'
111. Supra note 17, ss. 87, 89(1).
112. There is debate over whether these provisions are merely a creature of statute, subject to
revocation at the discretion of the Crown, or, like Aboriginal rights recognized under s.35 of
the ConstitutionAct, 1982, are a codification of an existing right with an independent source,
such as treaty promises. Although taxes are not specifically addressed in the written terms of
any treaties, assurances regarding taxation were clearly offered when at least some treaties
were negotiated. See Richard H. Bartlett, Indians and Taxation in Canada, 3d ed.
(Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1992) at 1-14.
113. [19901 2 S.C.R. 85 [Mitchell].
114. R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No. 1.
115. Mitchell, supra note 113 at para. 85, La Forest J. Although disagreeing on another point,
L'Heureux-Dub J. agreed with La Forest J.'s interpretation of the legislation. See also para. 50.
116. Ibid.at para. 86. See also Joel Oliphant, "Taxation and Treaty Rights: Benoit v. Canada's
Historical Context and Impact" (2003) 29 Man. L.J. 343. Oliphant concludes that, with
regard to these historic taxation relations, "the Crown's original aim was to shield Indians
until such time as they were able to participate in Canada's commercial mainstream" (at 372).
117. IndianAct, supra note 17, s.2 (defining "Indian" as aperson who is registered as an Indian
or is entided to be registered as an Indian). "Indian" may also refer to a person embraced by
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However, Justice La Forest did not subscribe to this interpretation in Mitchell
Drawing upon the history of such exceptions, he interpreted the provisions as
operating to "shield Indians from any efforts by non-natives to dispossess Indians
of the property which they hold qua Indians, i.e., their land base and the chattels
on that land base."' 8 The awkward phrase "qua Indian" is nowhere to be seen
in the legislation. So what does it signal, and what difference does adding this
phrase make? The following statement, which Justice La Forest adopted as an
accurate characterization of how the provision operates, is illuminating: "A tax
exemption on the personal property of an Indian will be confined to the place
where the holder of such property is expected to have it, namely on the lands which
an Indian occupies as an Indian, the reserve."... 9
Justice La Forest's interpretation of the provision is provocative. The statutory phrase "of an Indian ... situated on a reserve" has been transformed into
"of an Indian qua Indian situated on a reserve." This evokes, once again, a conceptual opposition, a splitting of self, that only strikes Aboriginal people, and results in the ebb and flow of their Aboriginality in a judiciably determinable
manner. 120 The provision's recast scope seems defined less by geography (on a
reserve) and whether the owner falls under the statutory definition of "Indian,"
and more by a manner of occupation ("as an Indian") that is understood ("expected") to map naturally onto that geography. JusLice La Forest's comments
imply that it is reasonable to expect that Aboriginal people live qua "Indians"
when they live on reserves, and that the way Aboriginal people live changeslikely becomes less "as an Indian," and more something else-if they live off the
s. 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, which provides that "Indians and lands reserved to
the Indians" are a federal head of power. The meaning in this section is not entirely settled.
It includes, at a minimum, those Aboriginal persons whose names are listed on the Indian
Register and persons who are Inuit. However, it potentially includes a much larger
population of First Nations persons who do not have status under the Indian Act. See e.g.
Joseph Eliot Magnet, "Who are the Aboriginal People of Canada?" in Magnet & Dorey,
supra note 27, 23 at 47-48.
118. Mitchell, supra note 113 at para. 87.
119. Ibid. [emphasis added].
120. For a critique of how Mitchell evades engaging Aboriginal people on their own terms and
serves to undermine any efforts to foster a sense of Canadian citizenship, see John Borrows,
"The Supreme Court, Citizenship and the Canadian Community: the Judgments of Justice
La Forest" [Borrows, "Citizenship"] in Rebecca Johnson et al.,
eds., GirardV.La Forestat
the Supreme Court of Canada 1985-1997 (Ottawa: Supreme Court of Canada Historical
Society, 2000) 243 at 261-64.
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reserve. This takes us squarely back to the factors that drove assessments of
whether "non-treaty Indians" were "Indians," and what living on a reserve was
seen to signal for the economic assimilation project.
Although other-and far less problematic--interpretations of Justice La
Forest's writing are possible, subsequent courts have explicitly adopted such a
reading of Justice La Forest's reasons. The judicial insertion of the phrase "qua
Indian" becomes pivotal in perpetuating the concepts developed within the
assimilation-era jurisprudence. It both permits sections 87 and 89 of the Indian
Act to be let loose from the moorings of their express language, and provides an
opening, if not a requirement, for subsequent courts to make pronouncements
about when or how an Aboriginal person acts qua "an Indian."
Justice La Forest explains that these statutory exemptions do not attach to
personal property that an "Indian may acquire, hold, and deal with ...in the
commercial mainstream. 121 Just like the phrase "qua Indian," there is no reference to "commercial mainstream" in the legislation-there is only reference to
reserves. The term "commercial mainstream" is conjured to give shape to an
economic opposition, identifying features of property not held "qua Indian"
and on a reserve. Perhaps most surprisingly, Justice La Forest assumes that
Aboriginal people understand this term to delineate a meaningful, boundary
line. He writes: "Indians, when engaging in the cut and thrust of business dealings in the commercial mainstream are under no illusions that they can expect to
'
compete from a position of privilege with respect to their fellow Canadians."122
Are "reserves," by definition, outside the concept of commercial mainstream?
Or do the ways in which an Aboriginal person has ownership "qua Indian"
conflict with how one is able to own in the commercial mainstream? The answers are not entirely clear.123
Implicit in Justice La Forest's approach is the notion that it is possible and
rational to conceive of Aboriginal people as holding personal property-both as

121. Mitchell, supra note 113 at para. 88.
122. Ibid. at para. 122. I thank John Borrows for pointing out to me that, in Mitchell, La Forest J.
makes a series of assumptions about what Aboriginal people believe or know, without
apparently hearing from Aboriginal people on the matters in question. See Borrows,
"Citizenship," supra note 120 at 262-64.
123. For one reading of what La Forest J. had intended and the difference between this reading
and the subsequent judicial interpretations, see Martha O'Brian, "Income Tax, Investment
Income, and the Indian Act: Getting Back on Track" (2002) 50 Can. Tax J. 1570 at 1576-77.
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all others do under the common law and as uniquely "qua Indian" 12'-and that
judges and tax officials can distinguish between the two types of ownership.
These sorts of oppositions resonate with the assimilation-era jurisprudence and
their logics of essentialized difference.
B. MITCHELL'S LEGACY
Mitchell was specifically about whether property was available for garnishing,
but the SCC engaged in a general discussion of the taxation provisions in which
the garnishment provisions are embedded. Subsequent cases draw on the discussion in Mitchell as a key precedent for interpreting statutory tax exemptions
of the Indian Act, especially where intangible property is at issue.
For example, the SCC cited Mitchell in Williams v. R.,125 a case that determined whether the section 87 exemption could capture unemployment insurance benefits. The intangible character of the payments raised the question of
their situs (where the payments should be deemed to be located) and, in particular, whether the income could be considered to be located "on a reserve."
Questions about situs are not uncommon in the taxation arena, and they are
typically answered by asking a series of questions about the nature of the incomeproducing transaction and the purpose of the taxation provision. 126 Consistent
with this practice, the Court in Williams found that the situs could be determined
by considering a number of connecting factors in light of the purpose of the exemption, the type of property, and the nature of the taxation. 12' Drawing upon
Mitchell, Justice Gonthier wrote: "The purpose of the situs test in [section] 87
is to determine whether the Indian holds the property in question as part of the
entitlement of an Indian qua Indian on the reserve." 28 On the facts of Williams,
Justice Gonthier found that the most important connecting factor that deter124. It is essential to avoid analogizing to rights arising under Aboriginal title here. Like the rights
in question under the taxation provisions, Aboriginal title rights are a distinct form of
property right. However, unlike the rights in question, they are not created by statute or
treaty, but have their origin in the coming together of colonial and indigenous legal systems.
See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukwl. For a discussion
of the most recent SCC findings on the nature of Aboriginal title, see McNeil, supra note 8.
125. Williams v. Canada, 11992] 1 S.C.R. 877 [Williams].
126. See e.g. Tim Edgar & Daniel Sandler, eds., Materialson CanadianIncome Tax, 13th ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at 217.
127. Supra note 125 at para. 37.
128. Ibid. at para. 19. See also paras. 32, 37.
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mined if an applicant qualified for unemployment benefits was the location of the
employment income. 129 As the income was earned on reserve, the unemployment
benefits were found to fall within the protective scope of section 87.
So what happened to "Indian qua Indian" and the contrast between onreserve and the commercial mainstream? These ideas do not seem to have played
much of a role in the Court's reasoning. The one exception is Justice Gonthier's
observation that "an Indian has a choice with regard to his personal property."13'
This choice, he wrote, is between situating property "on the reserve," where it is
protected from taxation and seizure, or situating it off the reserve, making it
"more fully available for ordinary commercial purposes in society. '"131 The only
contrast that resonates with Mitchell is the suggestion that "ordinary" commercial activities-or engagements with the "commercial mainstream"-do not
take place on reserves. Overall, Justice Gonthier's interpretation of the taxation
provisions seems to rest far closer to the provision's plain words.
Despite the differences between these two SCC decisions, subsequent courts
have read them as presenting a singular position, together invoking a considerable
set of oppositions about "Indians" that completely rejuvenate the presumptions
of the assimilation-era jurisprudence (if those presumptions were ever dormant).
Subsequent applications of the SCC's judgments illustrate the ease with which
contemporary courts consistently read the lead precedents in a way that invokes
13 2
and endorses a continuing role for the colonial economic logic.
For example, in Folster v. R., 133 the Federal Court of Appeal found that
Justice La Forest's reasons in Mitchell "characterized the purpose of the tax exemption provisions as, in essence, an effort to preserve the traditional way of life
'' 3
in Indian communities by protecting property held by Indians qua Indians. 4
Similarly, the court found that Justice Gonthier, in Williams, "sought to ensure
that any tax exemption would serve the purpose it was meant to achieve, namely,
the preservation of property held by Indians qua Indians on reserves so that their
129. Ibid. at paras. 39-43.
130. Ibid. at para. 18.
131. Ibid
132. It has been argued that the interpretations adopted by subsequent courts, and, in particular,
their focus on "the traditional way of life" of Aboriginal peoples, are not supported by the
SCC jurisprudence. See O'Brian, supra note 123 at 1576-77.
133. Folster,supra note 2.
134. Ibid. at para. 14.
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traditional way of life would not be jeopardized.""13 The court amplifies and makes
explicit associations between living on a reserve and living an "Indian way of life":
that Aboriginal people live "as Indians" when they live "the traditional way of
life," and that this way of life is what takes place on reserves. These associations
are, arguably, only implied in Mitchell (and are even less present in Williams).
Like the discussions about whether Mdtis children or enfranchisement applicants
live an "Indian mode of life," there is a presumption that the meaning of living
"the traditional way of life" is so obvious that it generally needs no elaboration.
The Federal Court of Appeal further developed these associations in Southwind v. Canada.'36 In this case, the income in question arose from a business.
The court interpreted section 87 of the Indian Act as supporting a contrast
between the income of businesses that are "integral to the life of the Reserve"'37
and the income of businesses "in the 'commercial mainstream.""38 The former
would likely qualify for the section 87 shield, while the latter would not. The
court explained that "commercial mainstream" is a term used to "isolate those
business activities that benefit the individual Native rather than his community
as a whole,"' 39 and that the job of the court in such cases is to "draw the lines,
as best we can, between ... income that is situated on the Reserve and integral
to community life, and income that is primarily derived in the commercial
mainstream, working for and dealing with off-reserve people."' 0 The term
"commercial mainstream" invokes the assimilation-era threshold that marks
Aboriginal people who are assumed to have made a break with their community due to their willingness to engage in income-earning activities that are for
their personal benefit. The court's approach is not unlike the contemporaneous
NRTA cases where an individual's claim to living an "Indian mode of life" would
be threatened by "protracted employment.''

135. Ibid. at para. 16.
136. (1998) 156 D.L.R. (4th) 87 (F.C.A.) lSouthwindl.
137. Ibid. at para. 13.
138. Ibid. In drawing upon the language of what is integral to community life, Linden J. appears
to be drawing upon the test for assessing whether a practice is protected as a s. 35(1)
Aboriginal right. This test asks about what is integral to the culture of an Aboriginal
claimant. See O'Brian, supra note 123 at 1576.
139. Southwind, ibid. at para. 14.
140. Ibid. at para. 17.
141. Desjarlais,supra note 93 at para. 22.
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Later the same year, in Recalma v. Canada,"'2 the Federal Court of Appeal
repeated its message that income-generating activity in the "commercial mainstream" contrasts with income-generating activity that is "'intimately connected
to' the reserve, that is, an 'integral part' of Reserve life."'4 3 How do we determine
the difference? The court tells us to consider the business activity "in relation to
1
its connection to the Reserve, its benefit to the traditional Native way of life."
The economic oppositions multiply, and yet seem to be just variations on the
same theme.
The Tax Court of Canada followed and expanded upon the jurisprudence
of the Federal Court. In Lewin v. Canada,"' the court pronounced on whether
investment income of Aboriginal individuals arose through "basically ordinary
services related to the economic aspects of life,"' or if it was connected to "the
protection or safeguarding of the interests, culture and development of the traditional way of life of the Indians living on the reserve."' ' The court implied
that the "traditional way of life" of Aboriginal peoples did not embrace "economic aspects" (or at least economic aspects beyond a subsistence economy).
14 8
The Federal Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.
There is a clear connection between the colonial presumptions for measuring
assimilation and the contemporary judicial analytic practices for understanding
when the property of an Indian qua Indian is situated on a reserve. For example,
in the 1906 decision in Hughes, the court found that Aboriginal people live "as
Indian" when they live on a reserve or outside the waged economy. 1 9 This turnof-the-century distinction is reflected in the Federal Court of Appeal's contemporary refrain that "'commercial mainstream' contrasts with 'integral to the life
of a reserve. ''' ..
142. (1998) 158 D.L.R. (4th) 59 (F.C.A.) [Recalma].
143. Ibid. at para. 9. For a critique of the reasoning in this case, see O'Brian, supra note 123 at
1577-78.
144. Recalma, ibid. at para. 11.
145. [2001] T.C.J. 242.
146. Ibid. at para. 63.
147. Ibid. at para. 25.
148. Lewin v. Canada, [2002] F.C.J. 1625 (C.A.).
149. Supra note 45.
150. Shilling v. Canada (Ministerof NationalRevenue) (2001), 201 D.L.R. (4th) 523 at paras. 6566 (F.C.A.); Folster,supra note 2 at para. 14.
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Contemporary taxation jurisprudence does not draw a distinction between
those who do and those who do not need protection and accelerated progression along an evolutionary scale based on economic practices. The contrast is
instead drawn between those whose economic choices are taken to signal that
they remain committed to living "qua Indian" and, therefore, on a reserve, and
those who have taken up a more individualistic path (as evidenced, in particular,
by being off the reserve or entering into business transactions with off-reserve
people and institutions). 5' But the result is essentially the same, and the onreserve versus off-reserve binary, with its linkage to living "qua Indian," remains
strong.
I am not suggesting that there is a straightforward and immediate causal relationship between what we see in the "non-treaty Indian" cases and the taxation
jurisprudence. My point is that, at the turn of the century, judges had no choice
but to ask about the Indian "mode of life," and the racist social theory of the
time necessarily informed their understanding of what that meant. The legislation no longer requires judges to turn to such concepts, but the ideas have gained
such normative traction within the panoply of judicial precedent that the courts
continue to draw upon and perpetuate them.' 52
In Fo/ster, Southwind, and Recalma, the Federal Court of Appeal articulated
a series of dichotomies and associations that, although not identical, are certainly
consistent. The court assumes that itcan identify "the traditional Native way of
life" and what would "benefit" that way of life, and that a connection exists between living this traditional life and living on reserves. There is also a rift between
economic activities that benefit an Aboriginal individual and those that benefit
an Aboriginal community generally, where the former flags a transition into the
"commercial mainstream" and is at odds with living "as an Indian."
Finally, the courts believe that all of these matters are judiciable, relevant, and
situappropriate for understanding when the "personal property of an Indian [is]
ated on a reserve." The SCC rearticulates aspects of this position in McDiarmid
Lumber Ltd. v. God's Lake First Nation,15 3 where it describes reserves as protected
places that specifically enable Aboriginal culture to be adhered to and reinforced. 5'
151. As discussed in Part V, the SCC, when questioned directly, formally disapproves of courts
adopting this stereotype.
152. For a discussion of the cloaking power of precedent, see Bell & Asch, supra note 22 at 59-64.
153. McDiarmidLumber Ltd. v. God's Lake First Nation, 12006] 2 S.C.R. 846.
154. Ibid. at paras. 105-07. As this decision turned on the meaning of "agreement" under s.
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Reserves are described as essentially figuring as enclaves of "true Aboriginal tradition," and only able to continue to serve this role if the marketplace is kept at
bay. Reserve-based communities can certainly be centres for facilitating cultural
strength and growth-the problem arises from the assumptions that reserves
naturally and obviously play this role, that cultural strength and growth cannot
be developed elsewhere, and that commercial activity is incompatible with robust Aboriginal cultures.155
The only decision of the Federal Court of Appeal that problematizes this
approach is Sero v. Canada."6 Justice Sharlow, writing for the court, observed:
[I]t is not clear to me whether, in determining the situs of investment income for
purposes of section 87 of the Indian Act, it is relevant to consider the extent to which
investment income benefits the "traditional Native way of life." ... [I]t is at least
arguable that the "traditional Native way of life" has little or nothing to do with
reserves.157

As the appeal did not turn on this matter, the court refrained from taking a definitive position on the relevance of asking this question. The court's obiter comment, however, does entertain exposing the presumptive associations between
reserves and "Indians living qua Indians," and between living off a reserve and
not living "as an Indian." It also questions whether the jurisprudence has strayed
unreasonably from the legislation.5 8 Overall, Mitchel's reference to "Indian qua
Indian," and the use of the term "commercial mainstream" to signal an opposition, has both drawn upon the rubrics from the past and spawned an enduring
legacy. While the logics of this legacy have been subject to some internal scrutiny, it is still, by-and-large, going strong.
90(1)(b) of the current Indian Act, I do not discuss this case here. For an analysis of this
case's place within the jurisprudence, see Constance Macintosh, "Developments in
Aboriginal Law: The 2006-2007 Term" (2007) 38 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 1 at 2-18.
155. For a more fulsome discussion, see Borrows, "Physical Philosophy," supra note 109.
156. [2004] 2 C.N.L.R. 333 (F.C.A.) [Sero], leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. 88.
See also Large v. Canada, [20061 T.C.J. 398, aff'd [2007] F.C.J. 1507 (C.A.). At trial, the
court observed that "the connecting factor referring to 'the traditional Native way of life' has
been criticized" (at paras. 46-50), but then considered whether there was any evidence that
the investment activities benefited the community. The matter was dismissed on appeal.
157. Sero, ibid. at para. 25.
158. For a discussion of this comment, see Martha O'Brien, "Investment Income and Indian
Reserves: The Disconnecting Factor" (2004) 52 Can. Tax J. 543 (providing case comments
on Sero and Frazerv.The Queen).
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IV. PERPETUATIONS AND INTERVENTIONS
Although the SCC has played a role in perpetuating such conceptualizations of
Aboriginality, it has also problematized them. In this Part, I illustrate how the
SCC has, on the one hand, identified and rejected the very sort of reasoning
that underlies much of the jurisprudence and policy that I have tracked, but
how, on the other hand, it has also implicitly applied them. This reflects, I
believe, the fact that this discourse is not a totalizing one, but is rather extremely
tenacious and hegemonic. Marlee Kline identified similar inconsistencies in
judicial reasoning in her work on racialized legal discourse, where prevailing
approaches and counter-narratives exist in tandem." 9
A. THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs).6 is concerned
with section 77(1) of the Indian Act, which provided that only band members
who are "ordinarily resident" on their reserve have the right to vote in band
council elections."' The Court was asked to determine whether these provisions violated the equality guarantees of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.'62 In their set of concurring reasons, the members of
Lhc Court agreed that the federal statute "reinforces the stereotype tnat band
members who do not live on reserves are 'less Aboriginal"" 63 and are "not interested in ...
preserving their cultural identity." 6 ' The decision included considerable discussion on the harm that has been done to the dignity of Aboriginal
persons by virtue of having "been only seen as 'truly Aboriginal' if they live on
reserves," 65 and how the statutory denial of the right of band members who do
not live on reserves to vote reified this harm. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 spoke
directly to the fact that "Aboriginal cultures and mores have been perceived as
incompatible with the demands of industrialized urban society," leading to the
159. Kline, supra note 18 at 458, 468.
160. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 [Corbiere].
161. Supra note 17, s.77(1).
162. CanadianCharterofRights andFreedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
163. Corbiere,supra note 160 at para. 92, L'Heureux-Dub J.
164. Ibid. at para. 18, McLachlin & Bastarache JJ.
165. Ibid.at para. 71, L'Heureux-Dub J.

MacINTOSH. FROM JUDGING CULTURE TO TAXING "INDIANS"

433

stereotyped "assumption that Aboriginal people living in urban areas must deny
their culture and heritage in order to succeed-that they must assimilate into
166
this other world."
We see here a direct acknowledgement of the economic oppositions that I
have been tracing through the jurisprudence and of the damage they have caused
to Aboriginal individuals and communities. Aboriginal people have been wrongfully perceived as losing themselves if they are successful in an urban centre
(e.g., they derive a decent income from a job), and Aboriginal culture has been
pigeon-holed as incompatible with living in an industrialized society or outside of
reserve communities.
The SCC sends out a somewhat mixed message. When asked directly, the
Court is quick to disparage those who would associate Aboriginality, or Aboriginal cultural identity, with having a de facto link to living on-reserve or offreserve, or for assuming that Aboriginal cultures are incompatible with working
in an industrial economy. However, such stereotyping seeps in indirectly, and
the common law is a soft and diffused target. When Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
commented in Corbiere that the on-reserve/off-reserve "perception is deeply
rooted and persistently reinforced,"16 I suspect that she was commenting on
society at large. The judiciary is also a part of this society and equally vulnerable to falling prey to these tenacious presumptions. We see some of these presumptions in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia'68 and R. v. Marshall.'69 I turn to
these Aboriginal rights cases not to discuss the Court's assessment of the claimant's specific section 35(1) rights and what is integral to the specific Aboriginal
cultures at issue, but rather to consider other elements of the judicial reasoning
process that illustrate how presumptions about the universal nature of Aboriginal
culture continue to surface implicitly.
B. IDENTIFYING IMPLICIT PERPETUATIONS
In Delgamuukw, the SCC explicitly rejects defining Aboriginality through economic oppositions, but then seems to implicitly build them into its reasoning.
The SCC found it an error of law for the trial judge to have concluded that

166. Ibid., citing with approval the Report of the Royal Commission, supra note 25.
167. Ibid
168. Delgamuukw, supra note 124.
169. R. v. Marshall,[1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [Marshall].
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the constitutionalized rights of an Aboriginal person would be abrogated if the
17
individual made the choice to "participate in the wage or cash economy. 1
The Court also found that, as a matter of law, Aboriginal title rights could not
extend to uses of title land that were inconsistent with the claimant community's
cultural relationship to the land. That relationship was established by "the
activities that have taken place on the land and the uses to which the land has
been put by the particular group.""'
Despite rejecting participation in the cash economy as legally relevant for
determining whether an Aboriginal person's constitutionalized rights qua Aboriginal have been abrogated, the Court's examples of what sorts of activities
would likely be prima facie incompatible with Aboriginal relationships to land
are industrial economic activities. The two examples that the Court gives are
strip mining and building a parking lot. The Court's characterization of Aboriginal title rests on a foundation that deems Aboriginal cultural practices to be
potentially inconsistent with having the capacity to decide to use land for its
best economic purpose. It seems inconceivable to the Court that an Aboriginal
people's relationship to a tract of land could be primarily economic, given the
Court's conclusion that the Aboriginal relationship to land has "an important
non-economic component."' 72 This definition of title, which the Court seems to
indicate is to apply universally to all Aboriginal peoples, necessarily requires that a
strong connection other than an economic one be made out. So, unless a strong
non-economic attachment is proven, it is unlikely that a claim to Aboriginal
title could be recognized. The oppositions that operationalized the nineteenth
century characterizations of "Indianness" and "Indian mode of life" continue to
flourish, although in slightly different manifestations.
Similar assumptions about the incommensurability of Aboriginal peoples'
cultures and economic interests arose in Marshall,which involved interpreting a
treaty. The clause in question was a promise by the Mi'kmaq signatories to not
engage in trade except at government "truckhouses" (or trading posts). 173 The
SCC had previously set out a number of principles that govern treaty interpretation. They include choosing "from among the various possible interpretations

170. Delgamuukw, supra note 124 at para. 50.
171. Ibid. at para. 128.
172. Ibid. at para. 129.
173. Marshall,supra note 169 at para. 6.
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of common intention the one which best reconciles the interests of both parties
at the time the treaty was signed."'
Basing its decision largely upon records that indicated the Mi'kmaq signatories had requested that the treaty include the establishment of a truckhouse
"for ...furnishing them with necessaries,"175 the SCC concluded that both

parties had intended that the treaty right to trade would "not [be] a right to
''
trade generally for economic gain, but rather a right to trade for necessaries. 17
1
The Court then defined "necessaries" as equivalent to a "moderate livelihood" 17
and being able to provide for "such basics as 'food, clothing and housing, supplemented by a few amenities,' but not the accumulation of wealth."'' 8 As a
result, the treaty right only permitted harvesting and selling resources (in this
case, eels) to the point that their sale would support such a lifestyle.
A large body of scholarly work has criticized these reasons because they assume that the Mi'kmaq would agree to a cap on their right to trade when trading
had "address[ed] ...day-to-day needs,"1 79 or that the British would not want
every fur that they could get to sell to the seemingly endless market demand
from merchants in England. 8 ' One of the more forceful critiques of the notion
that both of the parties intended this result was penned by Gordon Christie. He
wrote:
But what can be made of the argument that, in asking for a truckhouse to exchange
peltry, the Mi'kmaq were agreeing to a limit on the treaty right, such that they
could be prevented by the Crown from attempting to hunt and fish to the extent
that they might be able to trade for more than necessaries? Was that in the contemplation of the Mi'kmaq (or the British)? Does this suggest that if a Mi'kmaq
family had a good winter of hunting, came to a truckhouse to trade and found
that they could obtain more than necessaries with their substantial supplies of

174. Ibid.at para. 78.
175. Ibid. at para. 58.
176. Ibid.
177. Ibid.at para. 7.
178. Ibid. at para. 59.
179. Ibid
180. Bruce H. Wildsmith, "Vindicating Mi'Kmaq Rights: The Struggle Before, During and After
Marshall" (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 203 at 225-26. See also Gordon Christie,
"Justifying Principles of Treaty Interpretation" (2000) 26 Queen's L.J. 143 at 186; Warren
J. Sheffer, "R. v. Marshall: Aboriginal Treaty Rights and Wrongs" (March, 2000) 10
Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 77 at 95-97.
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pelts, the British could find that they had exceeded the terms of the treaty ...?
What would the Mi'kmaq family have imagined if they had been informed that
from that point on their hunting would be regulated, so that they could no longer
lawfully bring to the truckhouse a substantial supply of pelts? Had their people's
representatives agreed to such an arrangement? 81

Justice Binnie believed his interpretation "was the common intention in
1760. "182 Most of the critiques of this aspect of the judgment find it absurd
or arbitrary. I see his interpretation as continuing in the mold of contrasting
Aboriginal "modes of life" with participating in a cash economy, or Aboriginal
"lifestyles" being culturally commensurate with just getting by on "basics." It
is possible that Justice Binnie simply could not believe that the Mi'kmaq signatories could themselves imagine a life that went beyond meeting their "day-today" basic requirements-just as the Court in Delgamuukw could not contemplate that, somewhere in Canada, there may be an Aboriginal people whose
relationship to at least some tracts of land has a predominantly economic component.'83

V. COUNTERING THE DISCOURSE
Situations such as Marshall, where there are analytical deficiencies that allow
assimilation-era logics and assumptions to underwrite judicial reasoning, must
be ferreted out and challenged if we are to liberate our jurisprudence-and
Aboriginal peoples-from the harms of social evolutionary thinking. Canadian
legislation no longer asks the question of whether an "Indian" has achieved a
stage of civilization where he or she ought to be deemed capable of owning land
in fee simple. Such a question, directly put, would be met with well-deserved
outrage. But the ideological by-products and prejudices of earlier times persist.
We have created a common law concept of "Indianness" that reflects the legislated and jurisprudential definitions that were once crafted to enable assimilation-era state goals. These definitions also persist outside of the jurisprudence.
In his careful analysis of how Aboriginal people's mobility practices have been
181. Christie, ibid. at 186.
182. Marshall,supra note 169 at para. 59.
183. See R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [Giadstone]. See also Borrows, "Citizenship," supra
note 120 at 267 (observing that La Forest J.'s
dissent in Gladstone "seems to define
Aboriginal identity as resting at a seemingly lower level of social organization that did not
contemplate large scale commercial relationships").
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used to undermine their rights, John Borrows observes that the fictions of colonialism have been internalized by some Indigenous peoples,'84 leading some to
engage in self-policing and judging of others, pursuant to a form of the assimilation-era logics.185 The resulting damage is well-illustrated by the stories collected
by Bonita Lawrence in her aptly named book, "Real"Indians and Others.'86 In
this book, Lawrence draws upon interviews to explore "how mixed-blood urban
Native people understand and negotiate their own identities in relation to community and how external definitions and controls on Indianness have impacted
their identities."' 87 She often brings the analysis back to the harm fostered by
the persistent social and legal stereotype that "being Aboriginal and being urban
and mixed blood are mutually exclusive categories."188
I take direction from Patricia-Monture Angus, who wrote in her germinal
book, Thunder in My Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks: "Only by understanding
the history of the Canadian legal system can we then understand why the result of
this system is not justice."' 89 The ideas of "Indianness" and of living an "Indian
mode of life" that are discussed in this article arose in ugly times in Canadian
history and enabled state objectives which have since been formally acknowledged as unacceptable. As Marlee Kline writes, legal institutions have been
accorded power to define Aboriginal peoples, and "this power is often obscured
by the naturalizing and legitimizing effects of dominant ideology, especially
within the allegedly neutral domain of legal discourse."190 The origin of these
notions, and the jurisprudential discourse which they spawned, must not be
buried under the legitimacy that is accorded to the practice of following precedent. Any assumption that they represent a rational or legally relevant rubric is
an assumption born of a social theory that has long been discredited. We must
put such rubrics aside and aggressively mobilize those moments of judicial and
societal intervention that were evidenced in such cases as Corbiere.
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185. Ibid. at 408-11.

186. Bonita Lawrence, "Real"Indiansand Others: Mixed Blood Urban Native Peoples and
Indigenous Nationhood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).

187. Ibid. at1.
188. Ibid. at10.

189. Patricia Monture-Angus, Thunder inMy Soul-A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax:
Fernwood, 1995) at 35.
190. Kline, supra note 18 at 469.

